Introduction
In recent years studies on parliamentary voting have flourished both in terms of methodological innovations and geographical coverage. From the early work by Lowell (1901) and Rice (1925) on various aspects of cohesion scholars have developped sophisticated tools to deal with parliamentary voting data (see for instance for a survey Poole 2005) and gone beyond the British and US parliaments to cover a wide range of legislative chambers (for some comparative work see Carey 2007a; Hix and Noury 2007; Carey 2009; Depauw and Martin 2009; Coman 2012) . At the same time both in terms of theoretical insights and methodological innovations work on the US Congress has largely dominated the field. This domination in conjunction with a preconception that in Congress practically all business was conducted in roll call votes (see for instance Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 56 and below) has led to a considerable lack of attention paid to the exact voting procedures 1 used in parliaments. 1986; Saalfeld 1995; Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008; Carey 2009; Hug 2010; Crisp and Driscoll 2012 ) the datagenerating process that leads to roll call data inevitably varies. Nevertheless, scholars have relied on roll call data from different contexts without taking these differences into account (see for instance Carey 2007a; Hix and Noury 2007; Depauw and Martin 2009; Coman 2012) . Except under rather optimistic assumptions, such comparative work is fraught with considerable problems.
As these voting procedures vary considerably across parliamentary chambers (see for instance Interparliamentary Union
One reason why scholars proceed this way might be linked to a scarcity of comprehensive information on parliamentary voting procedures. While the Interparliamentary Union (1986) (see also Union Interparlementaire 1966), Saalfeld (1995) , Carey (2009) and Crisp and Driscoll (2012) provided such information, it is either dated (first two sources) or offers only partial coverage (the latter three sources). Consequently, in this paper we present a first glimpse at a comprehensive data collection effort, which aims at providing detailed and time-informative data on parliamentary voting procedures. The data collection relies on an expert survey carried out in the spring of 2012, with experts responding from an aca-demic background, but also members of the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments and other experts.
In the present paper we provide information on a first set of important aspects of parliamentary voting procedures for European parliaments and compare it with other data. 2 In the next section we briefly motivate the importance of considering the exact voting procedures used when doing research on parliamentary votes. Section three is devoted to a short description of our data source, namely the expert survey. In section four we report on essential features of parliamentary voting procedures in European parliaments as of today. Section five concludes and sketches our future research.
Parliamentary Voting Procedures
Recent work has alerted legislative scholars to the importance of institutional minutiae to understand parliaments. In a survey article Cox (2006, 141f) states that "important bills can only pass pursuant motions formally stated and voted upon in the plenary session" and that in the absence of constraining rules the "legislative state of nature" would result in an almost impassable bottleneck.
Parliaments have surmounted these problems to make themselves "efficient" (Cox 1987 ) by resorting to the "mirroring principle" (McCubbins 2005) , namely that the constraining rules adopted to confront the bottleneck "mirror" largely features of the polity concerned.
Central in these arguments are two features. First, without voting 3 on the floor of a parliamentary chamber few if any things would be done (see also Saalfeld 1995, 529; Aydelotte 1977, 13) . Second, political parties play in most legislatures the central role in surmounting the "legislative state of nature" (Cox 2006, 141f Crisp and Driscoll (2012) offer information on Latin American parliaments.
3 Voting, defined as the "act of indicating one's preferences among competing policies or candidates" (Finer 1987, 631) .
4 Many of the mechanisms that allow political parties to surmount Cox's (2006) bottleneck are only viable if party leaders can at least partially observe the voting behavior of their members.
MPs as agents are carrying out tasks for various principals (voters, parties, etc.) and that in such principal-agent relationships accountability plays a central role.
In terms of an MP's voting behavior, accountability hinges to a considerable extent on the exact voting procedures used in a parliament. In Carey's (2009) both individuals present in the chamber and actors outside (e.g., interest groups and voters) can monitor the behavior of their MPs.
As much of the theoretical and methodological innovations stem from research on the US Congress, and that for the latter it was commonly assumed that practically all business was conducted by roll call votes (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 56) , 5 the importance of voting methods was considerably downplayed. Thus, it cannot surprise that the issue of partial observability of MPs' voting behavior was raised by comparativists at first, for instance by Fennell (1974) , who tried to understand why some decisions in the Argentinian parliament were reached by roll call votes, while others were not. 6 Saalfeld (1995) provided a cursory glimpse at how voting rules differed across a set of western parliaments. The compendia published by Interparliamentary Union (1986) (see also Union Interparlementaire 1966) provided similarly some cursary information on the voting rules that were used by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008) and Hug (2010) Roberts (2007) and Clinton and Lapinski (2008) demonstrate that this assumption is quite erroneous.
6 Snyder and Ting (2005) offer a theoretical model motivating the use of roll call votes in the US Congress.
7 Many of these countries introduced electronic voting systems in their new parliaments, which explain the considerable focus of these studies on these voting methods. Additional aggregate information may be gleaned from the 2008 and 2010 "Global Survey of ICT in Parliaments" carried out by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations (see http://www.ictparliament.org/globalsurvey).
One may obviously wonder whether these voting methods matter for the typical information that scholars wish to extract from parliamentary voting records. The studies by Roberts (2007) and Hug (2010) provide quite solid proof that in the two chambers of the US Congress and the Swiss lower house voting procedures affect the voting behavior of MPs. In the former study procedural changes allow for such an assessment, while in the latter access to recorded (though not published) votes permits to draw such inferences.
8 Consequently, scholars would be well advised to consider more in detail the data-generating process when dealing with parliamentary voting data. Doing so requires on the one hand the appropriate data that we wish to make available (at least for European parliaments in this paper) and theoretical guidance to assess the consequences of the specific data-generating process (for a first attempt see Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008) .
Expert Survey
In order to generate information on the institutional rules of national parliaments we carried out an internet-based survey among experts of these various parlia- In order to collect this information, we considered all national parliaments included by Fish and Kroenig (2008) , a recent handbook on national legislatures focusing on parliamentary power.
9 By including as well some additional parliaments not considered by Fish and Kroenig (2008) 10 we have a final sample of 256 parliamentary chambers in 176 countries. In addition to these 176 countries, the European Parliament (EP) is included in the sample.
11
As we added some additional experts for the various parliaments to the list of experts provided by Fish and Kroenig (2008) , 1222 experts were contacted and asked to answer the questionnaire. Among them, there are 207 experts who are member of the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments and 11 experts on the European Parliament.
At the time of writing the data collection is in the process of being completed.
9 The authors of this volume have given us permission to contact the experts they have consulted in their expert survey (see Fish and Kroenig 2008 , list of experts consulted).
10 The following countries in our survey: Andorra, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Iceland, Isle of Man, Maldives, Monaco, Montenegro, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, and Suriname.
11 Contrary to the "Global Survey of ICT in Parliaments" (http://www.ictparliament.org/ globalsurvey) we did not include the Pan-Afrian Parliament, as its legislative mandate is still quite limited.
While some data checking has already been carried out, some conflicting information from our experts have not been completely addressed yet. Consequently, some of the initial analyses that we provide in this paper might not yet be the definite information.
Empirics
So far, we have systematic data for 55 chambers of unicameral and bicameral parliaments in 42 countries and one regional parliament, the EP. In each chamber, cameral rules define a method of voting as the standard operating procedure (SOP), which is the method that will be used unless another voting method is explicitly selected (Crisp and Driscoll 2012, 92, fn. 5) . Voting procedures can be distinguished according to the degree of information they disclose on the positions taken by individual members of parliament (MPs) (Saalfeld 1995 Standard operating procedures for votes taken on the parliamentary floor may vary depending on whether voting is on final passage of bills, the adoption of individual articles of some bill, amendments, budget motions or, where they exist, no-confidence motions. In this paper we confine ourselves to examine the case of final passage voting (which, in our future research, we will compare to the rules and methods of the other types of votes). Table 4 shows how often each of the three methods of voting is used as SOP for final passage votes in the 56 parliamentary chambers we cover in this paper.
Only in one out of our 56 chambers is secret voting defined as SOP for votes ballot paper and (iv) an electronic voting machine (EVM). In addition to the disclosed information on the behavior of individual MPs, the various subtypes of voting mainly differ with respect to how time-consuming they are and how accurate the decision outcomes they produce will be. Consequently, the frequent use of time-consuming voting procedures, such as voting by division, has been criticized due to its limited efficiency, especially when applied to uncontested votes (e.g., Wheare 1963, 31) . Table 1 Of course, when a single voting method is not mandated, the institutional requirements for invoking alternative voting procedures differ across chambers. For our sample of European parliamentary chambers, Table 3 provides an overview of the various actors that are entitled to request alternative methods of voting and to set aside the SOP (a more detailed description is given in Table 5 ). Overall, it is usually the individual MPs who are eligible to request some alternative vote procedure. However, there are also some chambers that allow their chairmen or parliamentary parties discretion over how to vote. If we compare our results with previous studies on voting procedures we arrive at some notable differences. While Saalfeld (1995, 541) 
Conclusion
The dominance of research on the US Congress and a rather flagrant misconception of the voting procedures in these chambers has lead to a situation where the 12 The comparison with Saalfeld's (1995) data is rendered difficult as the author only provides information on whether a particular voting procedure can be used, but not whether it is the SOP or to be used in particular circumstances. 13 We refrain from presenting a similar comparsion with the data provided by Carey (2009), as it is less complete and not as up-to-date.
14 The only exception are chambers for which we have not finished our data collection. (2010) shows, depending on the monitoring possibilities the behavior of MPs changes. 15 Consequently, we should be very wary of (especially comparative) work that fails to acknowledge the exact data-generating process, i.e., the voting procedures in place.
16
One might excuse the neglect that voting procedures had to endure due to a lack of systematic information on voting procedures. While some compendia (see our discussion above) offered a glimpse at the variation existing in terms of voting methods across parliamentary chamber, no source provides comparable, systematic and time-sensitive data on this central element of parliamentary rules.
In the present paper we have offered a first glimpse at a dataset in the process of being constructed on the basis of an expert survey. The data on European parliamentary chambers showed considerable variation and also changes across time. While the data presented in this paper are not yet completely validated and controlled, it shows at least the usefulness of our endeavor.
Our next steps will be to validate the data we have presented in the present paper and to do the same for data covering the non-European parliaments. This data will be made available in a first step to our experts, who proved to be an invaluable source for our research, and in a second step to the whole academic community. 15 Relatedly, a series of authors show that MP behavior varies over the electoral cycle, which is very likely to be related to the pertinence of the monitoring of various principals (see for instance Levitt 1996; Skjaeveland 1999; Lindstädt, Slapin and Wielen 2011; Traber, Hug and Sciarini 2011; Carroll and Nalepa 2012) . 16 As work by Londregan (2000) , Clinton and Meirowitz (2004) , Cox and McCubbins (2005) and Clinton (2012) among others show, we should also consider the larger "legislative game." Two experts reported that signal voting by rising in places is the SOP used in the Nationalrat of Austria, whereas two other experts claimed that open voting is the SOP. However, since the latter two specified that voting is by rising in places, we code the Nationalrat as having signal voting as SOP.
2
Of the two experts who answered the survey for the Bundesrat, one stated that the standard method of voting is by rising in places, while according to the other it is voting by show of hands.
3
For the Chambre des representants of Belgium, three experts filled in our survey. Two of them indicated that voting by electronic machine is the standard method, while one claimed it to be voting by roll call.
4
Two experts answered for the Senat of Belgium. According to one expert, the precise method is voting by electronic machine. The other expert, however, stated that it is voting by division. Our data for Croatia is based on the responses of a single expert. According to this expert, the following three voting methods are used: voting by show of hands, roll call and an electronic voting machine. Hence, we need to do more research on what the standard method of voting is.
7
In total, we have data from five experts for the Poslanecka Snemovna of the Czech Republic. 1993 was mentioned by three of them as the first year of the period for which open voting is the SOP. One person, however, stated that 1993 is the first year of this period (moreover, there is one NA). Further research thus is necessary, but for the time being we assume 1990 the be the correct date.
8
One expert chose signal voting as the current SOP.
9
Two experts reported 2004 and 1990, respectively.
10
Of the five experts who agreed that open voting is the SOP, four indicated that voting by roll call is the precise method and one person stated that voting by electronic voting machine is the exact method of voting. Needs further research since experts disagree.
14 Our data is based on the responses of three experts. Two reported that signal voting is the SOP, according to the third expert the SOP is open voting. However, the latter expert specified that voting takes place by show of hands. We therefore retain signal voting as the SOP.
15
The expert for the Bundesrat of Germany described the SOP as open voting. He however specified that voting is by show of hands. Therefore, we code the SOP as signal voting.
16
Of the four experts for the Vouli Ton Ellinon of Greece, three claimed that roll call voting is the specific method of voting used as SOP, while one person mentioned voting by division.
17
One of four experts for the Althingi of Iceland stated, however, that 1980 is the first year of the period for which open voting is the SOP.
18
According to one expert, this period started in 1981 (and ended in 1991).
19
The two experts who answered for the Dail Eireann of Ireland disagreed with respect to the precise standard method of voting: one indicated that it is voting by electronic voting machine, according to the other it is voting by division.
20
Data for the Seanad Eireann of Ireland is based on the answers of two experts. Due to disagreement between these experts, it is unclear whether the precise voting method is voting by electronic voting machine or division. Five experts report that the SOP is open voting. Three other experts, however, mention either signal voting or secret voting.
22
We have three experts for the Saeima of Latvia and secret, signal and open voting is each described one time as SOP.
23
One of the dates cannot be true, needs further research to be corrected.
24
However, one of the three experts for the Sobranie of Macedonia reported that signal voting is the SOP.
25
The expert who answered the survey for the Skupstina of Montenegro noted that open voting is performed by use of an electronic voting system, roll call or show of hands.
26
Six experts responded for the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal of the Netherlands. According to four of them, the SOP is signal voting by show of hands. Two however reported that open voting is the SOP. We need to do further research but for the time being, we code signal voting as the SOP.
27
One of the two experts for the Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal of the Netherlands mentioned that laws are assumed to be passed and individual factions may be noted to be opposed to the law. One of the three experts for the Stortinget of Norway noted that electronic voting is used since 1979 but that the votes used to be not easily accessible. Nowadays journalists may check the vote records and make them publicly available.
29
The two experts who responded for the Senat of Poland reported that the first year of the period for which open voting is used as SOP is 1989 and 1990, respectively. According to our records, the Senat was established in 1992 and we therefore code 1992 as the first year in which open voting is the SOP.
30
Although three of the four experts for the Assembleia da Republica of Portugal stated that open voting is the SOP, their subsequent responses seem to be inconsistent: one person reported that voting is by rising in places (which is an indication of signal voting), while the other two stated that voting is by division and using an electronic voting machine, respectively (which both may be a method of open voting).
31
The expert for the Senat of Romania reported 1990 as the first year in which open voting is used as SOP. Since, according to our records, the Senat was established in 1991, we code 1991 as the first year. 
36
Signal voting may have been the SOP (before open voting) from 1990 (sic!) to 1992. However, as our experts disagree, this has to be validated.
37
These dates need to be validated because one expert claims that signal voting was the SOP until 1985. 38 This is validated by secondary sources. However, one of our experts noted that the SOP is voting by acclamation (signal voting) and voting by using an electronic voting machine takes place if it is requested by an MP.
39
According to one expert for the Nationalrat of Switzerland, open voting is the SOP since 1980. According to the other expert, the first year of the period for which open voting is the SOP was 1995.
40
Either "-" or signal voting; needs to be validated.
41
Either "-" or 1980-1995; needs to be validated.
42
The expert for the Standerat of Switzerland defined the SOP as open voting but noted that voting is by show of hands. We therefore code signal voting as SOP.
43
The dates given by the two experts for the UK House of Commons, 1980 and 1983, differ from each other. This needs further research.
44
Either "-" or NA; needs to be validated.
45
Either "-" or NA; needs to be validated. According to one of our experts, 10% of all MPs or a parliamentary party may request a secret vote. However, an other expert reported that secret votes can not be requested in the Narodno sabranie of Bulgaria. Hence, further research is needed in order to determine whether a secret vote may be requested when voting is on final passage of a bill.
2
Two experts reported that a secret vote can not be invoked. One expert, however, indicated that a secret vote may be requested by 20% of all MPs.
3
Two experts stated that requesting a signal vote is not possible when voting is on final passage in the Eduskunta of Finland. By contrast, a third expert noted that the chairman of the chamber is entitled to request a signal vote. The Conférence des présidents includes the chairman of the chamber and the chairmen of various committees.
6
According to two experts, secret voting may be requested to vote on the final passage of a bill in the Vouli Ton Ellinon of Greece. The experts' answers differ however with respect to what actors are entitled to request such a vote.
7
Of four experts, one reported that signal voting may be requested.
8
Our data for the Orszaggyules of Hungary is based on the responses from a single expert. The expert indicated that a secret vote may be requested but no information was provided concerning the actors that are entitled to request such a secret vote. We have three experts for the Saeima of Latvia and each describes a different voting method as SOP.
10
According to one out of three experts, a signal vote may be requested by a parliamentary party. This needs further validation.
11
The experts' responses are inconsistent: one out of three reported that secret voting may be requested by 10 MPs or the chairman of the chamber.
12
Four experts agreed that open voting may be requested but their data differs with respect to who is entitled to do so. Three experts claimed that one MP suffices, whereas according to a fourth expert, 76 MPs are necessary. Moreover, three experts indicated that the chairman of the chamber is entitled as well. responses seem to be inconsistent: one person reported that voting is by rising in places (which is an indication of signal voting), while the other two stated that voting is by division and using an electronic voting machine, respectively (which both may be a method of open voting).
14 Two people served as experts for the Soviet Federatsii of Russia. As they defined the SOP as secret and open voting, respectively, further research needs to be done.
15
According to one out of two experts, only secret voting can be invoked: 50 senators may request a secret vote on final passage of a bill in the Senado of Spain.
16
According to the other expert, only signal voting can be requested. This may be done by either three parliamentary parties or the chairman of the chamber. 
